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Abstract
In contemporary public governance, leaders of public organizations are faced 
with multiple, and oftentimes conflictual, accountability claims. Drawing 
upon a survey of CEO’s of agencies in seven countries, we explore whether 
and how conflictual accountability regimes relate to strategic behaviors by 
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agency-CEO’s and their political principals. The presence of conflictual 
accountability is experienced as a major challenge and is associated with 
important behavioral responses by those CEO’s. This article demonstrates 
empirically how conflictual accountability is related to (a) controlling 
behaviors by principals, (b) constituency building behaviors by agencies, and 
(c) a general pattern of intensified contacts and information processing by 
both parties.
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Introduction
The contemporary world of public governance is characterized by multiplic-
ity in a dual sense. On one hand, the execution of many public tasks has 
shifted upward, sideward, or downward (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) to a large 
variety of agencies that fulfill public tasks while enjoying arm’s-length rela-
tionships with elected politicians (Dommett & MacCarthaigh, 2016; Pierre 
& Peters, 2020). On the other hand, these agencies often find their de facto 
discretion and autonomy restricted by the existence of dense webs of 
accountability (Page, 2006) in which they are held accountable by central 
governments as their principals yet also have to cope with (de facto) account-
ability claims from many others, such as regulatory authorities, courts of 
audit, clients, and societal stakeholders. This creates one of the prominent 
accountability challenges for executive organizations in contemporary gov-
ernance: coping with the conflictual expectations emanating from a multi-
plicity of “accountability forums” (Bovens, 2007; Martin et al., 2018) who 
operate on the basis of divergent institutional logics (Romzek & Dubnick, 
1987; Thomann et al., 2018).
The dominant stream in the public administration literature relates the mul-
tiplicity of accountability to a range of problems. It often features as a disorder 
(Koppell, 2005) leading to dysfunctional outcomes. The “problem of many 
eyes” (Bovens et al., 2014: 11) has for instance been identified as the root 
cause of technical disasters (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987), dysfunctional orga-
nizations (Koppell, 2005), policy failures (Halachmi, 2014), feelings of shame 
and embarrassment (O’Connell & Yusuf, 2018), and as a dilemma for street-
level bureaucrats (Thomann et al., 2018). The basic assumption is that multi-
ple accountability produces conflicting expectations for decision-makers with 
dysfunctional effects on various aspects of their behavior. There are, however, 
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also studies that highlight the potential advantages of multiple accountability 
(Schillemans & Bovens, 2011; Scott, 2000; Willems & Van Dooren, 2012). 
Here, conflictual expectations are not seen as problematic per se, but, rather, 
as stimulating more reflective and thorough decision-making processes which 
produce “better” outcomes in the sense that those agencies integrate more 
relevant values into their decisions. Conflicting values and expectations are 
key in both streams, yet the latter stream interprets the effects of multiple 
accountability on behaviors more optimistically.
While the challenges of multiplicity and conflictual accountability pres-
sures have often been noted in the public administration literature, empirical 
insights are so far scattered, at times contradictory and often unconnected. 
Against this background, this study aims to further our understanding of the 
behavioral effects of conflictual accountability in settings of delegated gov-
ernance. The purpose is to study the effects of conflictual accountability on 
behaviors of leaders in agencies and their counterparts in ministries.
We aim to make three contributions. We first of all aim to make a small but 
significant conceptual contribution by distinguishing conflictual accountabil-
ity from multiple accountability. Many public administration studies on 
accountability explore the tensions arising from multiple accountability rela-
tions, mechanisms, or institutions (Posner, 2002; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; 
Thomann et al., 2018; see Supplemental Appendix 4 for an overview). In 
these studies, multiplicity is often coterminous with conflictuality. This, how-
ever, need not necessarily be the case. In principle, multiple accountability 
“forums” (using Bovens’, 2007, concept) can in principle hold similar or 
conflictual expectations of what an agency should do. We therefore distin-
guish between the multiplicity of forums and the conflictuality of their expec-
tations: a distinction with important empirical relevance, as we will see in this 
article.
Second, although many studies explicitly or implicitly state that conflic-
tual accountability has major effects on the behaviors of decision-makers in 
public administration (Halachmi, 2014; Koppell, 2005), those effects have 
not been identified and studied systematically. This article therefore aims to 
further our understanding in a more systematic way by focusing on two 
important behaviors of decision-makers which can be affected by a conflic-
tual accountability environment. We first look at patterns of interaction. Put 
simply, with whom do they talk? (cf. Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Flinders & 
Tonkiss, 2016; Wood, 2015). We then look at information processing in 
decision-making. Again put simply, how thoroughly do they read and inform 
themselves when taking decisions? (cf. Aleksovska, 2019; Hall et al., 2017; 
Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015). Insights from behavioral sciences are 
included to develop these behaviors theoretically.
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Third, most empirical accounts of multiple or conflictual accountability 
are based on stand-alone, qualitative case studies (Willems & Van Dooren, 
2012; Yang, 2012) without comparisons across countries or counterfactuals. 
To further our knowledge beyond the (relevant) specifics of cases, we have 
therefore studied conflictual accountability and its behavioral effects in 
seven countries through original data collection. We surveyed the highest 
ranking managers (“chief executives” or “CEOs”) of agencies at arm’s 
length of government in Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. We measured the extent to 
which CEOs experienced their external accountability context to consist of 
multiple salient accountability forums, gauged whether these forums held 
conflictual views and studied patterns of interaction and information pro-
cessing by CEOs and their parent departments.
The analysis will show that almost all CEOs experience a context with 
multiple salient accountability forums. However, only in approximately 
half of the cases, they perceive those multiple forums to actually hold con-
flictual expectations of what their agency should do. This strongly suggests 
that multiple accountability is not necessarily experienced as conflictual by 
CEOs. We will subsequently see that conflictual accountability has a strong 
impact on both patterns of interaction as well as information processing by 
CEOs and their departmental counterparts. We will discuss these findings 
in “conversation” with literatures from public administration and behav-
ioral sciences.
Multiple and Conflictual Accountability
Accountability
Accountability is a key concept of democratic governance that has failed to 
reach an uncontested definition across academic disciplines. In this study, we 
follow Bovens (2007) and many others, who see accountability as a relational 
concept that relates an agent or actor with the power to take decisions with an 
account-holder or accountability forum who may scrutinize those decisions 
(cf. Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Mulgan, 2003; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). The 
forum guards formal norms or holds more generally expectations to which it 
wants the actor to live up to. When the forum is not satisfied with the agents’ 
behavior, or her account of that behavior, it may use formal or informal sanc-
tions to correct or punish the agent.
Accountability can be studied from a top-down and systemic perspective. 
The focus is then on the formal “accountability regime,” the sum total of all 
accountability mechanisms and relations within which an actor operates 
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(Scott, 2000, p. 55; Warren, 2014, p. 46). However, accountability can also be 
approached from a bottom-up perspective, through the eyes of the account-
able actor (Overman, 2020): in our case the CEO. The question is, to whom 
does the CEO feel or experience to be accountable? And what expectations 
does the CEO perceive that his or her salient accountability forums have? 
This approach dovetails with most of the studies in behavioral sciences where 
perceived or felt accountability takes center stage (Aleksovska, 2019; Hall 
et al., 2017). This bottom-up approach is helpful as we will be looking for the 
behavioral responses to conflictual accountability.
Five Problems
In the vast and expansive public administration literature on accountability 
(Bovens et al., 2014), many authors point at the multiplicity of accountability 
mechanisms and relations in modern governance and the conflictual expecta-
tions these produce for decision-makers. These issues feature prominently in 
some of the most cited public administration publications on accountability 
(Bovens, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Koppell, 2005; Mulgan, 2003; 
Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). A majority of recent studies on accountability in 
public administration (36 out of 47 studies, see Supplemental Appendix 4) 
explicitly acknowledges multiple or conflictual accountability. In these stud-
ies, multiple accountability is mostly seen as problematic as it creates con-
flicting expectations for decision-makers which are hard to satisfy. Five 
overarching problems prevail in the literature.
First of all, many scholars simply point out that public organizations are 
confronted with a multiplicity of accountability mechanisms (Allen et al., 
2016), accountability arrangements (Cuganesan, 2017), or accountability 
frames (Mills & Koliba, 2015). This may create the problem of multitask-
ing. Decision-makers in public organizations have to cope with and attend 
to a multiplicity of accountability mechanisms at the same time. This is 
said to come with high opportunity and transaction costs for organizations 
and may lead to accountability overloads (Halachmi, 2014). The costs of 
attending to all of these accountability mechanisms may outweigh the 
benefits.
A second recurring issue is the problem of many eyes (Bovens et al., 2014, 
p. 11). For instance, government agencies (Verschuere et al., 2006) and other 
executive bodies (Benjamin & Posner, 2018; Wille, 2016) see themselves 
confronted by a large number of accountability forums, such as oversight 
bodies, critical societal stakeholders, and audit institutions, who cast their 
eyes on the behaviors and decisions of those organizations. This creates the 
behavioral problem of coping with multiple accountability forums who will 
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not necessarily judge the organizations’ behavior by the same standard. 
Recently, the role of citizens or societal stakeholders as additional forums of 
accountability has received significant scholarly attention (Brinkerhoff & 
Wetterberg, 2016; Martin et al., 2018; Mizrahi & Minchuk, 2019). The impli-
cation of all of these perspectives is that CEOs have to take decisions in 
“webs of accountability” (Page, 2006).
A natural complement to the problem of many eyes is, third, the classic 
problem of many hands (Thompson, 1980). In modern governance, tasks are 
often performed in networks, collaborations, or they require collaboration 
between different levels of government (cf. Jones & Bouckaert, 2017). In 
such cases, multiple organizations and individuals have roles in the execu-
tion of public policy. This can be problematic for accountability in the sense 
that it is hard to pinpoint responsibility and to identify the individual or 
organization who is responsible for some outcome. The multiplicity of par-
tially responsible agents can easily lead to cynical blame games (Piatak 
et al., 2017).
The fourth issue is more theoretical and can be understood as the problem 
of competing institutional logics. The basic premise is that decision-makers 
in public administration operate in systems that are characterized by compet-
ing institutional logics, creating competing logics of appropriateness (Olsen, 
2013). In many studies, Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) now classic typology, 
discriminating between administrative, legal, hierarchical, and political 
accountability, is applied to study those competing logics. Others have 
pointed at conflicting institutional logics emanating from markets, the state 
and professions (Klingner et al., 2002; Thomann et al., 2018) or distinctive 
institutional logics following from upward (vertical), sideward (diagonal), 
and downward (horizontal) accountability (Bovens, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 
2003). The problem of competing institutional logics is most pronounced for 
organizations working on the cross-roads between different institutions and 
regulatory regimes, such as agencies at arms’ length (Benjamin & Posner, 
2018; Klingner et al., 2002; Wille, 2016).
Finally, although implicit in many of the issues above, several scholars 
explicitly point at what is the key problem in this study: the problem of con-
flictual expectations. Broadly constituted accountability regimes are easily 
associated with goal conflict (J. Christensen et al., 2018) and tensions 
between multiple relevant norms (Thomann et al., 2018). Conflictual expec-
tations and value conflicts are sometimes also embedded within the opera-
tions of public organizations. There can be tensions between program and 
performance goals and also between substantive goals and budgetary rules 
(Siverbo et al., 2019, p. 17). Those tensions lead to goal ambiguity with 
important consequences for the management of public agencies (Chun & 
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Rainey, 2005). Irrespective of whether conflictual expectations emanate from 
the sheer numbers of mechanisms, forums, agents, or institutional logics, the 
impact on organizational decision-makers is the same: it may create conflicts, 
making it hard, if not impossible, to take the “right” decision that satisfies all 
legitimate accountability expectations (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). In this 
context, Koppell (2005) spoke of multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD): 
a problem statement resonating in many recent studies (see Amsler & Sherrod, 
2017; Bertelli, 2016; Jantz et al., 2018).
In many studies, the multiplicity of accountability in terms of mecha-
nisms, accountability forums or otherwise is equated with the problem of 
conflictual expectations. This, however, need not necessarily be the case, nei-
ther theoretically nor, as we will see, empirically. A multitude of accountabil-
ity forums may foster aligned or even the same expectations. In the remainder 
of this study, we will therefore carefully distinguish between the multiplicity 
of accountability forums and conflictual accountability as conflicting expec-
tations by those multiple accountability forums.
Behavioral Responses to Conflictual Accountability
The presence of conflictual expectations from multiple salient accountability 
holders makes it hard for CEOs of agencies to set priorities and take deci-
sions. It has been described as a “dilemma” (Thomann et al., 2018) where no 
course of action is available that would satisfy all salient accountability 
forums. Several studies of policy failure in public administration identify 
conflictual accountability expectations as root cause of the eventual problem-
atic outcome (Halachmi, 2014). In some cases, one accountability claim is 
prioritized above everything else which could lead to disaster (Romzek & 
Dubnick, 1987), whereas in other cases, CEOs try to please all of their audi-
ences leading to a watered down compromise satisfying none of them 
(Koppell, 2005). In all of those cases, conflictual accountability has an impact 
on how CEOs take crucial substantive decisions.
We focus on two key behaviors of decision-makers at the highest level: 
patterns of interaction with their most relevant stakeholders and information 
processing in decision-making. CEOs consult with governmental and soci-
etal stakeholders, and they need to be selective in who they meet and with 
what frequency. CEOs and departmental officials also collect, read, and 
digest information when they have to take decisions and they, again, need to 
be selective in what they read and how much attention they allocate to spe-
cific decisions. Both behaviors are well documented in public administration 
research but also in behavioral studies on the effects of felt accountability 
(Aleksovska, 2019; Hall et al., 2017).
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From the bottom-up perspective of the CEO, the presence of conflictual 
legitimate expectations means that the goals for which they are held account-
able are ambiguous. Goal ambiguity (Chun & Rainey, 2005) and competing 
mandates and tasks—or, in our terms, conflicting expectations as to what 
one is accountable for—create ambiguity (Olsen, 2013) and make decision-
makers uncertain about the proper course of action, which makes it hard to 
“balance missions” (Carrigan, 2018, p. 679). The CEOs of agencies and 
their counterparts in government departments operate amid an enormous 
number of potentially relevant stakeholders. They have to take strategic 
decisions on how to allocate their precious time and attention in ambiguous 
accountability environments (Noordegraaf, 2000). Conflictual expectations 
may serve as a trigger that draws attention to issues and increases the efforts 
made by CEOs and departmental officials to consult with others and to 
inform themselves broadly when they take decisions.
Busy top bureaucrats will only invest precious time in meeting stakehold-
ers regularly when this is perceived to be merited for some reason. We there-
fore study some salient patterns of interaction for both the political leadership 
of the parent department as well as the CEO of the agencies, as important 
behavioral responses to conflictual accountability. Conflictual accountability 
is also related to how central government officials and CEOs digest informa-
tion in decision-making. The underlying mechanism is the same as above: 
given time-scarcity, busy top-level bureaucrats need to be selective in how 
much information they digest, what reports they read, and whether or not to 
look up extra information when taking key decisions.
Patterns of Interaction: The Role of the Ministry
The interactions between ministries and agencies are constituted in part in 
regular, formal meetings, in which the most important substantive, budget-
ary, and procedural issues are discussed. The CEO normally represents the 
agency in those meetings, whereas the ministry can be represented by sev-
eral persons. The seniority of departmental representation is a clear signal of 
the perceived relevance of a meeting to the ministry. The minister or highest 
ranking civil servants will only participate in those meetings when this is 
deemed to be strategically necessary to keep sufficient control of an agency. 
And conflictual accountability is likely to have just that effect. In general, 
low levels of interorganizational trust are related to more pronounced 
attempts to exert central control (Martin et al., 2018). Tighter central control 
is rational in a context of conflictual accountability. A recent example is 
provided by Kogan (2017, p. 633) in his study of the federal Food Stamp 
Program in the United States. This federal program is implemented locally 
Schillemans et al. 9
where, in our words, there were conflicting expectations and values related 
to the program with a marked impact on actual implementation. In response, 
key decisions were centralized on the federal level and upscaled hierarchi-
cally. This relationship between conflictual accountability and centralization 
was already noted in an old study in Norwegian by Knut Dahl Jacobsen 
(1964), Norway’s first professor of political science. He argued that conflic-
tual episodes between important stakeholders fueled contraction processes, 
concentrating power in ministries. The driving force behind this process 
then is, in more modern terms, the principal’s need for control in a context 
where he or she may have less trust that the agent’s behaviors are aligned 
with her preferences (Moe, 1984).
Patterns of Interaction: The Role of the CEO
Agency CEOs generally have no choice in relations with central govern-
ments, and they have to participate in formal interactions with their principal. 
They do however have considerable agency in how they cope with all other 
societal stakeholders (or accountability forums) in their strategic environ-
ment. They make the same strategic decisions about the deployment of their 
scarce commodity time as ministers and, again, engaging in more frequent 
interactions with societal stakeholders can be interpreted as a sign of salience.
The relationship between conflictual accountability and increased interac-
tions with societal stakeholders dovetails with recent studies demonstrating 
that public agencies may invest in voluntary forms of accountability (Koop, 
2014) or strategic interactions with stakeholders (Wood, 2015). In doing so, 
agencies generally target a very wide population of strategically important 
stakeholders as “voluntary accountability forums.” The multiplicity of con-
stituencies (Carpenter, 2001) can be a source of more autonomy as is also 
suggested in principal-agent frameworks of the effects of multiple principals 
(Moe, 1984, p. 769). Research on how public managers manage their account-
ability relations underscores this point empirically and demonstrates that 
managers often anticipate, combine, and prioritize various accountability 
demands to serve their strategic interests and guard their autonomy. From the 
agencies’ perspective, conflictual accountability offers opportunities as these 
societal stakeholders can be viable sources of autonomy vis-à-vis their prin-
cipals (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Carpenter, 2001). In a context of conflictual 
accountability, there are “multiple legitimate masters” (Posner, 2002), which 
may make agencies less responsive toward any one of those than when he or 
she interacts exclusively with one pivotal principal.
Psychological research on accountability adds a further dimension to this. 
Here, numerous studies find that accountable actors behave as “intuitive 
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politicians,” trying to please their various accountability forums (Lerner & 
Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 2002). A recent study in a public administration con-
text underscores this logic of intuitive position-shifting. The study found that 
individual judgments and recommendations were affected by the primes 
exerted in one’s accountability context (Ngoye et al., 2019). Thus, for both 
strategic and intuitive reasons, agencies may seek support in their environ-
ments in conflictual accountability.
Information Processing: The Role of the CEO
Conflictual accountability means that various stakeholders have different 
viewpoints and that CEOs somehow need to cope with the ensuing conflict-
ing expectations. Classic studies in our field have pointed at the relevance of 
integrative capacities of institutions (Olsen, 2013) and the mutual adjustment 
of competing values (Lindblom, 1959). Behavioral studies of decision-mak-
ing under accountability further underscores the relevance of integrating 
more information and values in decisions with the concept of “integrative 
complexity.” An integratively complex decision is characterized by the use of 
high levels of information, the ability to discern different salient dimensions 
of a specific issue and the ability to relate those different dimensions. This 
leads to decisions based upon a rich set of information and different relevant 
perspectives which are integrated (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 2014; Doney & 
Armstrong, 1995). Integrative complexity has been used in many studies and 
has been related to numerous desirable outcomes (Conway et al., 2014, p. 
607). Integrative complexity for instance improves negotiation outcomes 
(Tetlock et al., 2014, p. 629) while a drop in integrative complexity has been 
found to precede outbursts of violence (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 2014, p. 598). It 
leads to more systematic processing and weighing of information allowing 
decision-makers to distill their judgments from various salient “cues” 
(Hoffmann et al., 2017, p. 628). Concretely, integrative complexity denotes 
whether CEOs spend much time collecting and analyzing information from 
various sources for key decisions and whether they feel it is imperative to 
understand different sides to issues (cf. Doney & Armstrong, 1995; Ossege, 
2012).
Information Processing: The Role of the Ministry
The logic described above applies equally to bureaucrats in ministries who 
also need to be selective in how they process information. In addition to that, 
government departments act as principals for a large number of organizations 
while they themselves are the agents of various political principals (see also 
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Vosselman, 2016). Their political masters are selectively interested in what 
the agency does and the same holds a fortiori for the departments’ relation-
ship to its various agencies. Previous studies have suggested that central gov-
ernment departments are not always equally attentive to all of its delegated 
agencies and are sometimes found to have very little interest in their agen-
cies’ behaviors at all (Pollitt et al., 2001). This has been dubbed a case of 
“forum drift” (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015). Even though there is formal 
delegation, principals may not have delegated something of their own in rela-
tionships with agencies (Benjamin & Posner, 2018, p. 572). This can make 
the principal appear to be ambivalent toward, or outright disinterested in, its 
agency; and, this may be evidenced in how information from the agency is 
treated. Conflictual accountability makes it more salient for ministries to pay 
attention to the agency and would normally imply that officials in the minis-
try pay more attention to the information provided by the agency.
Research Design and Method
Case Selection and Sample
We studied the (a) perceived level of conflict in multiple accountability 
regimes, (b) strategic patterns of interaction, and (c) information process-
ing in strategic decision-making by CEOs of agencies and their parent 
departments.
We fielded a survey among the chief executives of all agencies at arms’ 
length of government in seven countries: Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, drawing on earlier 
comparative studies of such agencies (Verhoest et al., 2012). Although there 
are numerous differences between the agencies in those countries and their 
relations with central government, they lend themselves to our research pur-
poses. Using responses from several countries, the theoretical relations 
between conflictual accountability and behavioral responses are recon-
structed beyond national and contextual circumstances. Also, we were able to 
build on previous comparative studies on the agencies in those countries 
where responses were compared or aggregated (Mattei et al., 2013; Pollitt 
et al., 2001; Verhoest et al., 2012).
The countries in our sample vary in many ways, yet they lend themselves 
for comparisons. Among all the countries in the world, they are among the 
affluent countries, with stable democratic models and established administra-
tive systems of governance developed in the middle to north-west of Europe. 
The seven countries are among the “top performers” on many indicators of 
public sector performance, or they are at least almost always above the 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD, 2019) 
average. Furthermore, they have all gone through comparable, yet by no 
means similar, reforms over the last decades, which were informed by the 
same family of New Public Management ideas, which affects how ministries 
and agencies relate to each other (T. Christensen & Laegreid, 2006; Verhoest 
et al., 2012). In these countries, groups of agencies have been created that can 
be classified usefully, according to local experts, using Van Thiel’s typology 
(2012; see below). Many executive and regulatory functions—such as finan-
cial market regulation, various social welfare benefits, meteorology insti-
tutes, governmental shared services—are performed by these agencies in 
these countries. As such, there are already numerous cross-country studies on 
agencies focusing on (some of) our seven countries (cf. Verhoest et al., 2012). 
It is substantively important that the selection of agencies is homogeneous 
and comparable across countries, to avoid sampling errors (Verhoest et al., 
2018). We are interested in accountability of the important agencies perform-
ing public tasks in various countries, irrespective of their specific legal status. 
The organizational legal type is an important variable which might affect 
formal and felt accountability in agencies. We used the Van Thiel’s typology 
of governmental agencies as a unifying device because it is simple and clear 
and has already been applied to agencies in many countries. For our survey 
sampling strategy, we concentrated our efforts on the two types of agencies 
considered to be “most exemplary” and “most common” (Van Thiel, 2012, 
p. 19): Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 organizations are defined as semi-autono-
mous organizations, units, or bodies without legal independence but with 
some managerial autonomy. Type 2 organizations are defined as legally inde-
pendent organizations or bodies with managerial autonomy, either based on 
public law or on private law. In addition, we focused on agencies which are 
full organizations and not, as is common in many countries, “just” commit-
tees with the same legal status. The starting point were the country chapters 
collected in the volume by Verhoest and colleagues (2012), based on older 
surveys in the same countries (and many others). These were updated manu-
ally, based on existing (governmental) databases of agencies. Research assis-
tants then collected personal email addresses of the CEOs of these agencies.
Through this procedure, we created a sample of 1,096 agencies at the 
national level in the seven countries, incorporating all Type I and Type II agen-
cies that are actual organizations. These are the agencies that carry out public 
tasks with some autonomy from the politico-administrative center of the state 
(Van Thiel, 2012). We circulated an invitation to take part in the electronic 
survey between May and December 2017. We received 661 responses of 
which 496 were fully completed. In most countries, a response rate of about 
50% was achieved, and there was an overall response rate of 45% (Table 1).
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We collected additional data about nonrespondents in three countries: the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Denmark, to identify potential nonre-
sponse bias. We compared the organizational size between respondents and 
nonrespondents using Welch t tests, which correct for potential differences in 
variances between groups. We also identified the (non-) respondents’ genders 
and gender between respondents and nonrespondents, using χ2 tests of inde-
pendence. None of the t tests yielded a significant result: tuk(158.14) = 1.20, 
p = .23; tnl(98.13) = −0.26, p = .79; tdk(46.69) = −0.68, p = .50. Furthermore, 
none of the χ2 tests of independence yielded a significant result: χ2uk(1) = 
2.27, p = .13; χ2nl(1) = 0.72, p = .40; χ
2
dk(1) = 0, p = 1.00. Combining the 
data of these groups did not alter the conclusions. The results of these tests 
imply that there are no indications of systematic nonresponse.
Measurements
Conflictual accountability was measured in three steps. First, respondents 
were asked to identify their most important policy task. We wanted to focus 
on accountability for substantive decisions and not on administrative issues. 
Also, we wanted our respondents to focus on the same type of issue for com-
parability purposes. Furthermore, as many agencies have more than one task, 
we wanted respondents to focus on one task they perceived to be most impor-
tant. If they felt that more than one task was equally important, they were 
prompted to pick one.
Second, we asked respondents to indicate the perceived relevance of 18 
“accountability forums” regarding their most important task. By gauging the 
relevant accountability forums, we were able to map the accountability 
regimes of CEOs from a bottom-up perspective. Our initial expectation was 








Australia 91 170 54
Denmark 32 53 60
The Netherlands 56 105 53
Norway 85 168 51
Sweden 115 241 48
Switzerland 49 116 42
The United Kingdom 68 243 28
Total 496 1,096 45
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that we would find agencies with broader and narrower accountability 
regimes. However, it turned out that all CEOs responded similarly and indi-
cated that their parent departments were their most important stakeholders 
yet that, in addition, most other stakeholders were fairly relevant (see 
Supplemental Appendix 1). Almost universally, thus, agency CEOs perceive 
to operate in a context of multiple accountability.
Third, we asked respondents to identify to what extent these relevant 
stakeholders held mostly similar or mostly different views regarding their 
most important task. Now responses turned out to be highly polarized. 
Respondents mostly saw their accountability regime as either (fairly) con-
flictual or (fairly) non-conflictual. The distribution of responses was bimodal 
(see Figure 1). Our sample thus consisted of CEOs perceiving to operate in 
either multiple-and-conflictual or multiple-but-harmonious accountability 
regimes.
Behavioral Variables
As indicated, we focused on two types of behaviors: patterns of interaction 
with relevant stakeholders and use of information in decision-making. These 
have been gauged by surveying the CEOs of the agencies, which may incur 
some level of perception bias to our data. Yet, we have focused on factual 
questions and what the agency CEO perceives that her parent department 
does.
The forum’s interaction. This focused on the key dyadic relationship between 
agency and parent departments. We asked respondents to indicate the number 
Figure 1. Perceptions of conflictual accountability (N = 538).
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of annual formal meetings they had with their parent departments. We then 
asked who represented their parent department in those formal meetings. 
Options ranged from lower ranking civil servants to the minister, thus gaug-
ing a pattern of hierarchical escalation of representation.
The actor’s interaction. Here, we focused on the relationship of agencies to 
societal stakeholders. Two statements were used; the first relating to whether 
it is important to make performance results publicly available to all stake-
holders and the second about frequency of meetings with societal stakehold-
ers at a strategic level (Wood, 2015).
The forum’s use of information was measured with two items measuring the 
use by the parent department of information provided by an agency (Schillemans 
& Busuioc, 2015). Measures included both passive use (thorough reading of 
received information) as well as active use (queries for information).
The actor’s use of information was measured with two items on informa-
tion use in decision-making (Doney & Armstrong, 1996; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 
2014). The items measure whether decision-makers spend much time collect-
ing and analyzing information from a variety of sources prior to decision-
making and whether they experience that it is relevant to understand different 
sides to issues.
Organizational Variables
We used seven organizational variables as control variables, mostly based on 
coding of extra materials. Four of those were unrelated to conflictual account-
ability: legal status (coded on Van Thiel’s, 2012, typology), policy field 
(coded on Classification of the Functions of Government [COFOG]-criteria), 
and location of main office (located in capitol or not?). Three other organiza-
tional variables were related to the prevalence of conflict and had some 
effects in our models, see below.
Country. We used the seven countries in our analysis, and this was statisti-
cally significant. There are, thus, differences between the countries, which 
could also be expected, yet we will focus here on the robust similarities 
beyond those national differences.
Size. We used numbers of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE)’s as a measure for 
size and coded this from various sources. FTE’s ranged from 0 to 21,127, 
with a mean of 651. In general, we found that larger agencies, which are gen-
erally more politically salient, were also confronted with more conflictual 
accountability regimes.
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Task. The survey focused on accountability for substantive decisions related 
to one’s most important task. Respondents were asked to select one from 
several options describing their primary task, such as “collecting or distributing 
payments” or “regulation.” This was also related to conflictual accountability 
as will be mentioned shortly later.
Reflection
The central premise of our research design was to relate conflictual account-
ability to a range of organizational and behavioral variables. To this end, we 
used existing scales and measures where possible and overall ascertained 
comparability in design across national samples, to avoid common mistakes in 
border-crossing research (Verhoest et al., 2018). Also, we were able to build 
on existing research infrastructures and contacts in the seven countries. 
Although we believe in the strength of our approach, our research certainly 
has limitations. To begin with, the survey measures perceptions of behaviors 
by our respondents, not the behaviors themselves. This is obviously a limita-
tion of our data, common in survey research. We contravened this in part by 
asking factual questions, for instance about representation in meetings (the 
minister either is or is not present). An additional advantage of those factual 
questions is that they decrease the risk of common method bias (Favero & 
Bullock, 2015). Also, we compared organizations and responses across coun-
tries which invokes comparability limitations. Furthermore, our analyses are 
also limited in terms of gauging causality. We are able to see (strong) relations 
between variables in the data, most of which stem from the survey but others 
from the additional coding, but it is difficult to disentangle cause and effect. 
This study shows relations yet does not prove causality; the latter can only be 
constructed theoretically and must therefore be read with some caution.
From Multiple to Conflictual Accountability
This article started with the assertion (see Supplemental Appendix 4) that 
multiple accountability features prominently in the public administration lit-
erature on accountability and is generally associated with conflicting values 
and expectations. Our survey of the CEOs of agencies in seven countries 
confirms the relevance of the first part of this statement (about multiplicity) 
yet nuances the second part (conflicting expectations). The agency directors 
surveyed underscore that they, indeed, virtually without exception, feel 
accountable to a large multitude of accountability forums when they take 
substantive decisions regarding their most important policy task. A broad 
accountability regime encompassing many (in)formal accountability forums 
is, in the eyes of those CEOs, standard reality.
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However, within these broad accountability regimes, some CEOs perceive 
this environment to be largely conflictual while others experience their 
accountability regime to be largely harmonious. Our results show a bimodal 
sample, where respondents mostly either did or did not perceive their account-
ability environment to be conflictual. Figure 1 below visualizes the responses 
and shows a polarized, non-normal landscape. The survey indicates that 
agency CEOs mostly either experience their accountability regime to be 
broad-but-harmonious or broad-and-conflictual.
Testing Behavioral Effects Conflictual Accountability
To test the effects of conflictual accountability on patterns of interaction and 
information processing, a one-way MANOVA was used. This statistical test 
is used to analyze effects of the separation of agencies into groups on multi-
ple outcome variables. Furthermore, it allows to control for the potential 
effects of other variables, including country, type, and task. This analysis was 
followed by a series of post hoc ANOVAs to assess the separated effects on 
the individual dependent variables.
The one-way MANOVA that controlled for country, type, and task, yielded 
a statistically significant result for the difference between similar and different 
views, Wills’ Λ = .939, F(4, 398) = 6.455, p < .001, partial η2 = .043. This 
demonstrates that there is a significant effect of non-conflictual versus conflic-
tual views on the combined dependent variables. This effect is consistent 
across various alternative specifications of the model, including multiway 
MANOVA tests that model the interactions between the independent vari-
ables. Also these alternative specifications provide no evidence for different 
effects in different countries or across different agency types. These analyses 
underscore the robustness of the model. In the individual ANOVAs, we con-
sistently find an effect of non-conflictual versus conflictual views on all of the 
dependent variables. All analyses are controlled for country and type effects.
Although this article does not focus on the antecedents of conflictual 
accountability, we conducted a logistic regression analysis of its prevalence 
in relation to organizational variables (see Supplemental Appendix 2). We 
found that three organizational variables were related to conflictual account-
ability. First of all, we noted differences between the countries; the percep-
tion of conflictual accountability was higher in some countries than in 
others. We mostly interpreted this as an indication of quality of the data. 
With a sample like ours, significant differences between the countries can 
only be expected, yet we also find robust relations beyond national differ-
ences. Furthermore, conflictual accountability is related to the type of tasks 
agencies perform. Particularly, agencies with regulatory tasks experience 
that they have to cope with a conflictual accountability regime. In addition 
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to that, larger agencies also experience more conflictual accountability. 
These findings potentially suggest the relevance of political salience as an 
explanation (cf. Koop, 2014). It makes sense that higher political relevance 
goes together with more potential contestation and thus, more conflicting 
accountability. This logic of salience also seems highly prevalent in the 
behavioral responses to conflictual accountability, as we will discuss below.
Patterns of Interaction
Central Government: Hierarchical Escalation of Representation
We asked our respondents who represented their parent department in formal 
meetings. Do they generally meet lower ranking civil servants in regular 
meetings with their parent department or do they speak directly with the 
highest ranking civil servants or even the minister? Hierarchical escalation of 
ministerial representation is interpreted as a sign of salience that expresses 
the interest of the political leadership in the agency. Our analyses show that 
the hierarchical level at which the ministry is represented is significantly 
higher for agencies perceiving conflictual accountability, F(1, 406) = 15.993, 
p < .001, as the figure below shows. This effect suggests that there is indeed 
a pattern of escalation in representation when the views of various account-
ability forums are perceived to be conflictual and that senior bureaucrats and 
ministers are more likely to engage with agencies in a context of conflictual 
accountability. This is visualized in Figure 2.
To corroborate this finding, we also looked at which accountability 
forums were indicated as most relevant by the agency (see Supplemental 
Appendix 1). This confirmed that when the overall accountability regime is 
deemed to be more conflictual by our respondents, the ministerial cabinet 
or central government is also described as more relevant for the agency. 
This finding was also statistically significant, supporting the relationship 
between conflictual accountability and escalated hierarchical representa-
tion in interactions.
It is common to interpret the direct personal involvement of political and 
administrative leaders as indicative of central control. It makes sense that 
broad-and-conflictual accountability regimes provoke controlling responses 
from central government as the context makes it more difficult to align the 
agencies’ behaviors to the principal’s demands. Central departmental control 
of arm’s-length agencies is in principle expected to be relatively loose, leav-
ing room for quite some discretion on the part of the agencies. In conflictual 
settings, however, central control may be tightened to the point where it can 
been called “authoritarian” (Flinders & Tonkiss, 2016).
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All in all, we sense a pattern of hierarchical escalation from the side of 
central government in relation to conflictual accountability, which we inter-
pret as a sign of the ministries’ attempt at hierarchical control of the agency.
CEO: Intensification of Interactions With Societal Stakeholders
We gauged how our agency heads interact with broader stakeholders with two 
questions. We asked about the frequency of interactions with societal stake-
holders and we asked whether they saw it as relevant to make their results 
publicly available to all stakeholders. Both questions signify a “horizontal ori-
entation” on the policy network beyond the hierarchical relationship to central 
government (Wood, 2015). When we compare the interactions of CEOs in 
conflictual accountability settings with those in harmonious settings, we see 
significant differences. CEOs in conflictual accountability regimes report 
more frequent meetings with their societal stakeholders than their colleagues, 
F(1, 406) = 4.513, p = .034. See the visualization in Figure 3.
The intensification of interactions with societal stakeholders in settings of 
conflictual accountability seems comparable in its strategic thrust to the hier-
archical escalation of representation from the side of central government. 
They both signify efforts to juggle with autonomy and control (T. Christensen 
& Laegreid, 2006) and reinforce each other. Conflicts and centralization may 
stimulate “gamemanship,” where accountable actors will seek to influence 
their control systems (Siverbo et al., 2019, p. 4). More generally, a conflictual 
Figure 2. Hierarchical escalation of representation.
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context with multiple accountability expectations stimulates agencies to 
guard their reputations as key strategic assets (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016). It 
becomes ever more important to manage expectations, to “keep up appear-
ances,” and to make good impressions on the many relevant, yet conflictual, 
accountability forums.
Information Processing
Central Government: Increased Use of Information
We analyzed the use of information by central governments through our 
respondents’ perceptions of two items. Our respondents were asked whether 
they often received queries for information from their parent departments and 
whether they perceived that information and reports sent to the department 
were thoroughly read. Thorough reading and frequent queries indicate active 
and attentive focus by a parent department and better use of information. 
Agency CEOs perceiving more conflictual accountability report more fre-
quent queries from parent departments than those in harmonious account-
ability regimes: F(1, 406) = 4.484, p = .035 (see Figure 4).
The link between conflictual accountability and the use of information 
underscores the dominant logic we see so far. Conflictual accountability makes 
the agency more salient in the eyes of its parent department or central govern-
ment, and they expend more time in monitoring, requesting information, and 
Figure 3. Meetings with external stakeholders.
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reading reports from the agency. Beyond this strategic relevance of increased 
use of information, there is also a decisional advantage as more thorough infor-
mation processing may obviously enhance the quality of decision-making 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In psychological studies of the effects of account-
ability on the quality of decision-making, more thorough and intensive infor-
mation processing is seen as important, as we will elaborate below.
CEO: More Thorough Use of Information
We found that CEOs experiencing conflictual accountability report different 
patterns of information use in decision-making. In keeping with other studies 
(Aleksovska, 2019; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), we see a clear association 
between the conflictual nature of views by accountability forums and the 
information-processing efforts reported by CEOs. We see a significant differ-
ence with regard to the importance to understand all sides to issues by CEOs. 
Agencies that report conflictual accountability also report more integrative 
complexity of decision-making, F(1, 406) = 10.261, p = .001. Conflictual 
accountability is thus related to higher information-processing efforts by 
agency heads, suggesting it is more salient to be in the know and to be well-
prepared (see Figure 5).
Integrative complexity is, although never a formal goal, also an important 
value for decision-making in public organizations, where CEOs have to 
Figure 4. Departmental demands for information.
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weigh several, oftentimes competing, values. This is exactly the point made 
in studies of multiple accountability, although expressed in different word-
ings (Olsen, 2013; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Thomann et al., 2018). 
Several recent studies in public administration settings implicitly support 
the relevance of integrative complexity. In a study of non-executive boards, 
for instance, Roberts et al. (2005, p. S16) found that some boards helped 
executives to “make as full a use as possible of the different views and expe-
riences” leading to better decisions. In a very different study focusing on 
case workers, Hwang and Han (2017) found that accountability pressures 
had a positive effect on cognitive dimensions, such as “talk,” “discussion,” 
and “gathering of more information” (see also Belardinelli et al., 2018; 
Kogan, 2017). Interestingly, recent studies also relate integrative decision-
making by managers to the “negativity bias” in their strategic environment, 
stimulating improved decisions (Holm, 2018; Nielsen & Moynihan, 2017). 
Negativity and conflictual expectations with multiple relevant stakeholders 
have a focusing effect on decision-makers; they exert “pre-emptive self-crit-
icism” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and weigh their own decisions from mul-
tiple angles before they commit to some course of action. This improves the 
informational quality of decisions in public administration and is related to 
conflictual accountability.
Figure 5. Integrative complexity decision-making.
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Conclusion and Reflection
This article has explored, theorized, and measured behavioral effects of con-
flictual accountability. Our study of the experienced accountability by the 
CEOs of agencies at arms’ length of government in seven countries confirms 
that multiplicity—being accountable to a large number of accountability 
forums—is the “normal state” in contemporary governance, as is suggested 
in many studies (Bovens, 2007; Martin et al., 2018; Romzek & Dubnick, 
1987; Thomann et al., 2018). However, contrary to expectations, we find that 
CEOs do not necessarily equate the multiplicity of their accountability regime 
with conflicting expectations. Almost half of our respondents experience 
their environment as broad-and-conflictual whereas just more than half of 
them operate in accountability regimes perceived as broad-yet-harmonious.
Conflictual accountability is often understood as problematic and the 
source of tensions and conflicts. Pessimistic accounts have shown that the 
conflictual nature of accountability may lead to dysfunctional behaviors 
and decision-making in public sector organizations (Halachmi, 2014; 
Klingner et al., 2002; Koppell, 2005). Conversely, however, some empiri-
cal studies (Schillemans & Bovens, 2011; Willems & Van Dooren, 2012), 
in conjunction with psychological research on the effects of accountability 
on decision-making (Aleksovska, 2019; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), suggest 
that conflictual accountability may also have positive effects on the quality 
of decision-making.
This article has shown that the effects of conflictual accountability on 
behaviors are not unidimensional. On one hand, we see that it is associated 
with distinctive strategic patterns of interaction and use of information. 
Conflictual accountability is related to apparently more strategic behaviors 
by agency directors and their political principals. But it is also related to 
decision-making processes in which more information is collected and used 
which theoretically leads to better-informed decisions. Better-informed deci-
sions seem to be the normatively positive epiphenomena of increased strate-
gic awareness by both parties in the dyadic relationship.
Table 2 summarizes our results. We distinguish between what we see in 
the data and how we interpret what we see. The patterns are simple, strong, 
and robust in the data. Under conditions of conflictual accountability, CEOs 
and senior officials devote more time to meetings with strategic stakeholders. 
And both parties pay more time and attention (Noordegraaf, 2000) to infor-
mation in decision-making.
Reverse causality, however, is a likelihood we cannot exclude. It is possi-
ble that the perception of conflictual accountability is triggered by interaction 
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patterns and information processing rather than the other way around, 
although we do not find that theoretically convincing. It seems more convinc-
ing that conflictual accountability is related to increased political salience 
which affects behavioral responses to accountability (Busuioc & Lodge, 
2016; Koop, 2014). Also, it is likely that causes and effects cannot be disen-
tangled. From an institutional perspective on accountability (Mattei et al., 
2013; Olsen, 2013), it is likely that political events, political salience, pat-
terns of hierarchical interaction, interactions with stakeholders, and conflic-
tual accountability are not unidirectionally related and co-evolve over time. 
If that is the case, our attention should be diverted from disentangling causes 
and effects to understanding more fundamental patterns of interaction in con-
flictual or harmonious accountability regimes.
One important implication from this article is that effects of conflictual 
accountability are not unidimensional and defy exclusively negative or 
critical interpretations. Conflictual accountability is related to a range of 
behavioral effects, which can be interpreted gloomily or optimistically, 
depending on one’s normative perspective. This is comparable with the 
related process of politicization. Our findings suggest that politicization 
and conflict is not necessarily problematic, as is sometimes suggested in 
the literature, but may have surprising positive effects on the quality of 
bureaucratic decision-making and may also activate their social identity 
as experts to withstand getting drawn into party politics (Salomonsen 
et al., 2016).
A second proposition emerging from the research presented here is the 
relevance of using insights and theories from behavioral science in studying 
behaviors in public administration. Many public administration scholars 
have implicitly or explicitly discussed the behavioral effects of conflictual 
Table 2. Theorizing Behavioral Effects of Conflictual Accountability.
Patterns of interaction Information processing
 Ministry We see escalation of hierarchical 
representation in interactions.
We see more use of information 
in decision processes.
We interpret reinforcement of 
hierarchical control.
We interpret more attentive 
focus by government.
 CEO We see more frequent 
interactions with societal 
stakeholders.
We see more queries and better 
information processing.
We interpret management of 
constituencies, reputation, and 
support.
We interpret more integrative 
complex decision-making by 
CEO.
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accountability yet so far only very few of those have explicitly used the 
relevant insights and conceptual apparatus offered by behavioral scientists. 
By connecting those literatures, major advances in our knowledge are pos-
sible (Battaglio et al., 2018). This is not only relevant academically but also 
practically for decision-makers in public administration. This perspective 
suggests that decision-makers are influenced by subtle, institutionalized 
cues (see Ngoye, Sierra & Ysa, 2019, p. 262). CEOs should recognize the 
fact that their perceptions and judgments, as well as those of their supervis-
ees, may be clouded by their cognitive frames-in-use, which, in turn, are 
primed by incidental features of their decision environments. Put differently, 
this suggests that conflictual accountability regimes may perpetuate certain 
approaches upon stimuli that decision-makers are exposed to. These effects, 
though subtle and nonconscious, may explain the pervasiveness of some 
logic or frameworks.
All in all, this article has shown that CEOs of agencies in our seven coun-
tries almost universally perceive to operate in a context of multiple account-
ability. This, however, is not the same as operating in a context of conflictual 
accountability where they have to cope with competing expectations. 
Conflictual accountability was found to be consistently related to some 
salient behaviors by agency CEOs and their departmental counterparts. It 
intensifies both patterns of interaction as well as the processing of informa-
tion. We interpret that this signifies both increased strategic behaviors to keep 
control by both parties but, as an epiphenomenon, also improves the use of 
information in strategic decision-making.
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